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H.: Contributory Negligence--Look and Listen Rule
WBST VIRGINIA LAW QUABTERLY

:at law, where the doctrine of subrogation is not recognized. There
;are no reported cases in this state where the remedy has been
-refused the beneficiary when the action was a bill in equity. The
:seeming conflict in the West Virginia cases is readily explainable
on. the theory that the right of the third party to sue at law in West
Virginia on such contracts is not recognized, but when he sues in
equity he is given substantially the same relief under the doctrine
,of subrogation.
-M. T. V.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - LooK AND LISTEN RULE.-The
plaintiff sued for injuries sustained while attempting to cross the
-tracks of the defendant. He passed between freight cars standing
on the side track and started to cross the middle track, when he
was struck by an engine. Nine feet separated the tracks, and
-plaintiff had an unobstructed view each way, but failed to look
in the direction of the approaching engine. Held, recovery is
denied. Failure to use his senses amounts to contributory negligence, which becomes a question of law for the court and not for the
jury. Robinson v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 110 S. E. 870 (W.
Va. 1922.)
Widely divergent views exist among the various state courts in
regard to the liability of the railroad for injuries to pedestrians
who fail to stop, look and listen before attempting to cross the railroad track. Pennsylvania enforces the arbitrary rule, declaring
failure to observe the rule is negligence as a matter of law. The
decisions declare the rule to be "peremptory, absolute and un'bending." Aiken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 130 Pa. 380, 18 Atl. 686.
This extreme rule has practically no follbwing, and has received
widespread criticism. 1 AM. LAw REP. 204. The view that it is
not a rule of evidence, but one of absolute and unbending law
cannot be affirmed as a rule of American law. 2 THOMPsON, NEGuGENCE, § 1642. For the court to say that the plaintiff is negligent
;as a matter of law in every case if he does not stop, look and listen,
seems to be an unwarranted encroachment on the province of the
jury. 13 HARv. L. REV. 226. Other authorities emphatically
maintain that such failure on the part of the plaintiff is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, but is only evidence to be sub-mitted to the jury. 2 THoMPsON, NEGLIGENCE, § 1642; Judson v.
Central Vermont R. Co., 158 N. Y. 597, 53 N. E. 514; Illinois Cen-
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tral R. Co. v. Jones, 95 Fed. 370; French v. Taunton Branch R. Co.,
116 Mass. 537. These two views show the extreme holdings. One
line of decisions holding it an arbitrary rule of law, and the other
line considering it evidence for the jury. There is an intermediate
class of cases that seemingly meets with popular approval in determining whether the question is for the court or jury, and that is,
that the surrounding circumstances impose upon the traveller the
duty of stopping, looking and listening. This is the view of the
principal case, and we submit that it is the most reasonable doctrine. 3 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS, § 1167; 22 R. C. L. 1030. For extensive citation of authorities, see 1 Am. LAw REP. 203. This holding
seems to be the trend of late decisions in many jurisdictions. If
the negligence of the plaintiff is palpable, showing a disregard of
personal safety, the courts do not hesitate to pronounce such conduct contributory negligence as a matter of law. On the other
hand, if the circumstances indicate doubt as to the negligence of
the plaintiff, the question is submitted to the jury. There are a
number of cases from various states decided within the last year
which are clearly in line with reasoning and holding in the principal case. Loughman v. Hines, 200 Pac. 1086 (Wash.); Butler v.
Payne, 203 Pac. 869 (Utah); Saddler v. Northern Pacific R. Co.
203 Pac. 10 (Wash.) ; Morrow v. Hines, 233 S. W. 493 (Mo.); Alexander v. St. Louis, San Francisco R. Co., 233 S. W. 44 (Mo.);
Holtkamp v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 234 S. W. 1054 (Mo.) ; Reynolds
v.Hines, 185 N. W. 30 (Iowa); Murden v. Virginia R. & Power
Co., 107 S. E. 660 (Va.); Swearingen v. United States Ry. Administration, 183 N. W. 330 (Iowa). It is submitted that these cases
lay down the more reasonable rule, and that the measure of caution depends on the circumstances. Ruenzi v. Payne, 231 S. W.
-C. P. H.
294 (Mo.).
EVIDENCE-RAPE-COMPLI NT.-In

a prosecution for attempt to

commit rape, the husband of the prosecutrix was permitted to
testify, in corroboration of his wife, as to the particulars of the offence as related to him by his wife six hours after it occurred.
Held, it is reversible error to permit a witness to testify to the particulars. State v. Peck, 110 S. E. 715 (W. Va., 1922.)
Formerly it was laid down that one could corroborate his witness by evidence showing that he had been consistent with himself,
but, as a general doctrine, that ceased to be the law in England a
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